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Abstract (206 words) 
 
The study of visual memory is typically concerned with an image’s content—e.g., how well, and with 
what precision, we can recall which objects, people, or features we have seen in the past. But images 
also vary in their quality: The same object or scene may appear in an image that is sharp and highly 
resolved, or it may appear in an image that is blurry and faded. How do we remember those 
properties? Here 6 experiments demonstrate a new phenomenon of “vividness extension”: a 
tendency to (mis)remember images as though they are ‘enhanced’ versions of themselves — i.e., 
sharper and higher-quality than they actually appeared at the time of encoding. Subjects briefly saw 
images of scenes that varied in how blurry they were, and then adjusted a new image to be as blurry 
as the original. Unlike an old photograph that fades and blurs, subjects misremembered scenes as 
more vivid (i.e., less blurry) than those scenes had actually appeared moments earlier. Follow-up 
experiments extended this phenomenon to saturation and pixelation—with subjects recalling scenes 
as more colorful and resolved—and ruled out various forms of response bias. We suggest that 
memory misrepresents the quality of what we have seen, such that the world is remembered as more 
vivid than it is. 
 
Keywords: scene perception, memory, vividness, boundary extension 
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What’s in a picture? The images we see have content, such as objects, places, events, and 
people; a photograph, for example, might show two friends strolling on a beach. However, images 
vary not only in their content, but also in their quality: A photograph of the very same beach-walk 
may be sharp, resolved, and saturated; or it could be blurry, grainy, or faded—and this too is a 
property of images that we may see and encode. Research on visual memory is typically concerned 
with memory for the former kinds of details—i.e., the capacity and precision of our ability to recall 
contentful information such as which people, objects, events, places, colors, or shapes were present 
in an image. But what about the latter kinds of details? How do we remember the quality of the 
images we see? 
Suppose, for example, that you see a blurry photograph, grainy television broadcast, or faded 
piece of artwork, and you attempt to recall not what the images were about, but instead how blurry, 
grainy or faded they were, regardless of their content. Is memory for such properties accurate? Or 
might such memories show biases, misrepresenting the quality of the images we see? Here, we 
explore this question by investigating memory for image quality. 
 
Are memories better or worse than the real thing? 
What kind of bias might there be for memories of image quality? On one hand, memories 
decay (in that stored information becomes harder to retrieve over time), and this might produce a 
corresponding “decay” in the quality attributed to those features. In that case, as memories of a 
photograph or broadcast fade into the past, we might remember the images themselves as having 
been grainier and more faded. Indeed, it has recently been suggested that memories “literally fade”, 
such that images may be estimated as less bright or salient when they are recalled from memory than 
when they are viewed online (Cooper et al., 2019). This prediction not only seems subjectively 
intuitive, but it could also naturally emerge from sensory recruitment models of working memory, 
VIVIDNESS EXTENSION  p.4 
on which such memories are essentially reactivations of sensory states (Harrison & Tong, 2009; 
Serences et al., 2009). Since such reactivations are subject to decay, we might expect to 
misremember images as lower-quality than they really were, if we re-enter a lower-quality state at recall. 
(Or, we might simply remember the quality of such experiences accurately, if the revisited sensory 
state were sufficiently well-preserved.) 
On the other hand, memories often fill in details that were not actually present during 
encoding. One salient example of this process is “boundary extension”, wherein scenes are 
misremembered as being wider-angled and having additional objects and details that are typical of 
those scenes (Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Park et al., 2007). Such phenomena might imply a bias 
toward remembering images as higher quality. This prediction—that images could be remembered as 
though they were “enhanced” versions of themselves—may seem less intuitive; after all, memory is 
often characterized as a weaker or less vivid form of perception. At the same time, a tendency towards 
“vividness” might be consistent with models of memory that incorporate prior knowledge or 
schemas in reconstructing what was seen (Bartlett, 1932; see also Brewer & Treyens, 1981; 
Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991), including more recent incarnations of such models that 
characterize the role of prior knowledge in terms of Bayesian updating (Bae et al., 2015; Hemmer & 
Steyvers, 2009; Persaud & Hemmer, 2016). Indeed, there may even be anecdotal evidence for such a 
tendency: For example, when one returns to a famous television broadcast or childhood video game, 
one often observes that the broadcast or game seems lower-quality than one remembered (was the 
footage really that grainy?), as if the images are remembered in “higher definition” than they really 
appeared (perhaps because the mind added extra image details based on prior knowledge). 
Do either of these directional biases occur? Here, we ask whether memory—specifically, 
working or short-term memory—systematically misrepresents the quality of what we have seen. 
Subjects saw degraded scenes (e.g., blurry, pixelated, or desaturated images), and were then asked to 
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reproduce such degradation in a new image. To foreshadow the key result, we observed a tendency 
towards vividness, wherein subjects remembered scenes as being (on average) less blurry, more 
resolved, and even more colorful than they had actually appeared moments before—a phenomenon 
we call “vividness extension”. 
 
Experiment 1: Vividness Extension for Blur 
  
 As an initial test of vividness extension, we asked subjects to remember and reproduce the 
amount of blur in an image that was seen moments earlier. Are such memories distorted with 
respect to vividness? 
 
 
 
 
Remember this
(2 seconds)
Blank display
(2 seconds)
How blurry was it?
(adjust until satisfied)
Time
Figure 1. On each trial of Experiment 1, subjects were shown a scene that was distorted by a 
random amount of blur. After a delay (during which the screen was blank), the same scene 
reappeared in the same location, but this time at a different random blur value. Subjects were 
instructed to use a slider to “adjust this image to be exactly as blurry as the one you just saw”, 
with no time pressure. A similar design was used in the other experiments, though see text for 
details about how they differed. Readers can experience this task for themselves at 
https://perceptionresearch.org/vividness. 
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Method 
Participants 
 100 subjects were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk. (For discussion of this 
subject pool’s reliability, see Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013.) Here, this sample size was 
chosen simply because it seemed large; later experiments used and pre-registered this same sample 
size (except Experiment 6, whose larger sample size was also pre-registered); we also report power 
analyses given those sample sizes.  
Stimuli and Procedure  
 The experiment consisted of 50 trials, each proceeding in the same way (Figure 1). On each 
trial, subjects saw one of 50 natural scenes (256x256px) drawn from a range of categories (e.g., 
beach, mountain, street; Oliva & Torralba, 2001). Each presented scene was distorted by a different 
amount of Gaussian blur: On each trial, one scene appeared at a random blur value (0–20px radius), 
and remained on the display for 2 seconds. Next, it disappeared for 2 seconds (during which the 
screen was blank), until the same scene reappeared in the same location, but this time at a different 
random blur value (also drawn from the 0–20px range), with a slider located above it. Subjects were 
instructed to “adjust this image to be exactly as blurry as the one you just saw”, and used the slider 
to alter the blur level of this second scene until they believed it matched the blur of the earlier scene. 
(The “sign” of the slider was randomly assigned to each subject, such that for approximately half the 
subjects, the slider’s left end was the blurry end and the right end was the clear end, and for the 
other half of subjects, right was blurry end and left was clear.) After estimation, the adjustable scene 
disappeared, and the next trial began after 2 seconds. 
 Subjects were excluded if their blur estimates were not significantly correlated with the true 
blurriness of the images over the span of 50 trials (which may have indicated a lack of understanding 
or engagement), or if they failed to contribute a complete dataset. (These same exclusion criteria 
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were used for every experiment here, and were pre-registered for Experiments 3–6.) 
 Readers can experience the task for themselves at: https://perceptionresearch.org/vividness. 
Additionally, all data, analyses, materials (i.e., stimuli and experiment code), and pre-registrations (for 
Experiments 3–6) are available at https://osf.io/wjtnx. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Subjects tended to overestimate the clarity of the remembered images. In other words, 
subjects adjusted the test scenes to be less blurry than the true blurriness of those scenes, estimating 
the blur-radius at an average of 8.54px, which significantly differed from the true average blur-radius 
of 10px, t(80)=10.62, SE=0.14px, d=1.18; 95% CIbias=1.46[1.19,1.73], p<.001; Figure 2A. (4 subjects 
were excluded for failing to contribute a complete dataset; of the 96 subjects remaining, a further 15 
were excluded for poor data quality, using the pre-determined exclusion criteria. However, no effects 
reported here depended in any way on these exclusions; in other words, all effects remained 
statistically significant regardless of whether these data were included—and this is true for every 
experiment reported in this paper.) 
 Figure 2A also breaks down the effect by individual blur values. As can be seen, even though 
vividness extension was observed overall, this trend was not evident at every single presented blur 
value; indeed, for the clearest (i.e., least blurry) images, there was actually a blur-bias in recall, not a 
vividness-bias. However, this pattern can be explained simply by the estimation constraints imposed 
on subjects, which allowed subjects to respond only within the same 0–20px blur range that the 
images appeared in. For example, consider the most extreme case: an image shown in perfect clarity 
(i.e., 0px blur). For that image, it was only possible to observe a blur-bias, unless every single subject 
always estimated its blur with perfect accuracy; instead, the fact that this sort of trial (and others 
toward the “clear” end of the spectrum) show a blur-bias can be explained simply by a tendency to 
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respond towards the center of the estimation scale (either because subjects avoid extreme responses, 
or because some subjects sometimes responded randomly or uncarefully), in a way that causes a 
parallel regression-to-the-mean effect (i.e., to the mean of possible slider values). By contrast, the 
overall tendency towards vividness, collapsing across all blur values, seems to go beyond the 
particular constraints of the scale. Indeed, this can also be seen by noting that the estimate for the 
“halfway” point of the scale (10px) was a blurriness value of 8.9px (i.e., less blurry, or more vivid), 
suggesting that the tendency we observed occurred over and above any mean regression. (See 
Experiment 6 for another analysis that further explores this pattern.) 
 These results thus lend initial support to the hypothesis that subjects remember scenes as 
more vivid than they really were—a phenomenon of vividness extension. 
 
Experiments 2–4: Vivid Memories or Biased Responses? 
 
Do we truly remember images as more vivid? Perhaps, instead, subjects prefer vivid scenes and simply 
adjusted the test scenes to match this preference (e.g., because they enjoy looking at vivid images, or 
would like the images to be vivid, etc.; Firestone & Scholl, 2015). Or perhaps subjects deceived 
themselves into believing the scene was clearer—a kind of “hindsight bias” (Roese & Vohs, 2012) 
produced by learning the scene’s true, unblurred identity upon exploring with the slider at test 
(which may even alter appearance; Perez, Cook, & Peterson, 2020). Experiments 2–4 ruled out these 
possibilities. 
 
Method 
 Experiments 2–4 proceeded in the same way as Experiment 1, except as noted here. 300 
subjects participated (100 in each experiment). For Experiments 3 and 4, the hypothesis, sample 
size, and analysis plan (including exclusion criteria) were pre-registered. Assuming the same effect 
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size and exclusion rate as in Experiment 1, each of these experiments had greater than 99% power 
to detect vividness extension. 
 In Experiment 2, the only difference from Experiment 1 was that the target scene was left 
on the screen at test, such that the blurriness estimation was made during online viewing instead of 
from memory. In other words, subjects were given the same instructions as in Experiment 1, except 
they were asked to adjust the blurriness of an image to match not some previously remembered 
image, but instead a copy of that image that was still easily visible on the screen. The purpose of this 
modification was to rule out a more general response bias favoring vividness; if the results of 
Experiment 1 arose simply because subjects enjoy setting the slider to the vivid end, then that bias 
should apply in this case too (à la the El Greco fallacy; Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; 
Valenti & Firestone, 2019). However, if the vividness extension effect from Experiment 1 is 
explained by a genuine memory distortion, then any effects here in Experiment 2 should be smaller 
or non-existent. 
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Figure 2. Subjects recalled recently seen images as more vivid than they really were. This pattern 
held across (A) blur, (B) pixelation, and (C) saturation. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of 
the mean difference between estimated vividness (as recalled) and actual vividness (as presented). 
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In Experiment 3, the only difference from Experiment 1 was that the to-be-recalled blurry 
scene was different than the adjustable scene used for estimation (Fig. 3A). In other words, subjects 
were given the same instructions from Experiment 1—i.e., to reproduce the amount of blur they 
had just seen—but using a different token scene image. The purpose of this modification was to test 
whether the vividness extension effect was merely due to acquiring new information about the true 
identity of the adjustable scene while moving the slider. For example, in Experiment 1, after seeing a 
blurry “beach” scene at encoding and then moving the slider around at test, subjects had the 
opportunity to learn all sorts of finer details about the scene, which may have caused a kind of 
“hindsight bias” (Roese & Vohs, 2012) such that subjects believed they knew these finer details all 
along. By making the blurry target scene and adjustable scene different (e.g., a blurry beach at 
encoding, and an adjustably blurry forest at test), we prevented participants from gaining this new 
information about the beach, such that manipulating the slider shouldn’t alter their representation of 
the previously seen image. In that case, observing vividness extension even in Experiment 3 would 
suggest that hindsight bias could not fully explain the results. 
Finally, Experiment 4 combined the designs of Experiments 2 and 3 into a single within-
subjects experiment. Subjects saw two kinds of trials, randomly interleaved: “perception” trials (as in 
Experiment 2), and “memory” trials (as in Experiment 3), both involving an adjustable test image 
that had a different identity than the target image. In other words, in a “perception” trial, subjects 
might adjust a forest scene to match the blur of a beach that was present on the display during test; 
and in a “memory” trial, subjects might adjust a forest scene to match the blur of a beach that had 
been presented moments earlier. This allowed us to compare tendencies toward vividness in 
perception vs. in memory, in the same individual subjects, tested under the same circumstances. 
 These experiments thus ask whether vividness extension is a memory distortion per se, or 
whether it can be explained by other factors. 
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Results and Discussion 
 All three experiments supported a genuine memory distortion, rather than a response bias or 
hindsight bias.  
 In Experiment 2, where the blurry image remained onscreen at test, a very small vividness 
extension effect emerged (9.67px vs. 10px, t(95)=5.31, SE=0.06px, d=0.54, 95% 
CIbias=0.33[0.21,0.45],  p<.001); however, this effect was considerably smaller than in Experiment 
1—and significantly so, 8.54px vs. 9.67px, t(175)=7.87, 95% CIdifference=1.13[0.83,1.42], p<.001. This 
suggests that, even if subjects do prefer to look at clearer scenes, this can’t explain all (or even most) 
of the original vividness extension results. 
 In Experiment 3, vividness extension emerged again (Fig. 3B). Subjects overestimated the 
clarity of remembered images, even when the estimation procedure offered no new information 
about details in the remembered scene, and even under the unusual circumstance of matching a 
property of one scene to that same property on a completely different scene. The average blur 
estimate was 9.40px, which significantly differed from true average blur of 10px, t(73)=3.98, 
SE=0.15px, d=.46, 95% CIbias=0.60[0.30,0.90], p<.001). Note that this result is in some sense opposite 
the one that would be expected if scene knowledge altered perception of blur in this experiment 
(e.g., as reported by Perez, Cook, and Peterson, 2020, who suggest that familiar objects look less 
blurry than unfamiliar ones). In the present experiment, the ability to explore the test scene and 
determine its identity (by adjusting its blur) should have made that scene (i.e., the test scene) appear 
less blurry, which in turn should have made subjects select a blurrier match to compensate, not a 
clearer one. So, this result suggests that the overall tendency towards vividness cannot be explained 
by an impact of high-level scene knowledge on perceived blur.  
VIVIDNESS EXTENSION  p.13 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Experiment 4 allowed for a direct comparison of perception and memory in the same 
subjects. And indeed, vividness extension for memory (average blur estimate: 9.00px) was stronger 
than for perception (average blur estimate: 9.28px), t(91)=2.47, SE=0.11px, d=.26, 
Figure 3. (A) In Experiment 3, subjects recalled the estimated the blurriness of one image by 
adjusting the blurriness of a different image. (B) Even under these conditions, a tendency towards 
vividness emerged. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean difference between 
estimated vividness (as recalled) and actual vividness (as presented). 
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CIdifference=0.28[0.05,0.51], p=.015. This result thus served as a replication of each of the patterns 
observed in Experiments 2 and 3: Vividness extension is observed even when the test image differs 
from the target image, and it is stronger when image quality is recalled from memory rather than 
judged online.  
 These results suggest that the phenomenon of vividness extension goes beyond response 
bias or hindsight bias, and in fact reflects a genuine distortion of memory for vividness. 
 
 
Experiment 5–6: Vividness Beyond Blur—Resolution and Saturation 
 
Does vividness extension generalize beyond a scene’s clarity? Experiments 5–6 explored this question 
for resolution and saturation, asking whether subjects misremember images as less pixelated and more 
colorful. 
 
Method 
 Experiments 5 and 6 proceeded in the same way as Experiment 1, except as noted here. 100 
subjects participated in Experiment 5, and 500 subjects participated in Experiment 61. Both 
experiments were pre-registered.  
Stimuli and Procedure 
 In Experiment 5, the type of degradation applied to the images was pixelation. The scenes 
shown at the time of encoding were degraded to various levels of pixelation (which we report here 
                                               
1 Assuming the same effect size and exclusion rate as Experiment 1, Experiment 5 had over 99% power to detect a 
vividness extension effect of similar size. By contrast, a pilot version of Experiment 6, which obtained a marginally 
significant effect, suggested that 500 subjects would achieve 98% power to detect vividness extension for saturation; we 
thus pre-registered this sample size for Experiment 6. As is clear from the results, however, the effect in Experiment 6 
ended up being comparable to other experiments, such that 500 subjects turned out to be far more than was required to 
detect the relevant effect. 
VIVIDNESS EXTENSION  p.15 
in terms of normalized degree of pixelation, between 0 and 1). Then, at test, participants were asked 
to match the amount of pixelation (rather than the amount of blur as in previous experiments). One 
important property of the pixelation space as a test of vividness extension is that, whereas the blurry 
images from Experiment 1 ended up having a larger spatial envelope (since the blur bled out beyond 
the boundary of the original image), this was not true for highly pixelated images, which maintained 
their precise dimensions even as they became more pixelated. Moreover, the “pixelation space” as 
implemented here had different non-uniformities than the previous “blur space”. For example, with 
blurry images, just a tiny bit of blur applied to an otherwise crisp image was quite subjectively 
noticeable, whereas a similar move of the slider at the blurrier end of the spectrum was perhaps not 
so noticeable; for pixelation, this was reversed, such that a small amount of pixelation applied to a 
crisp image was not so subjectively noticeable, whereas equal steps at the highly pixelated end of the 
spectrum were very noticeable. As a result, pixelation differed from blur not only in being a new 
property, but also a new kind of degradation space in which to explore vividness extension. 
 In Experiment 6, the only difference relative to Experiment 1 was that the distortion applied 
to the images involved saturation, such that the scenes shown at the time of encoding could vary 
from 50%–150% of their native saturation. At the time of making their estimate, participants 
matched the amount of saturation in the scene instead of the amount of blur (Experiment 1) or 
pixelation (Experiment 5), using the same 50%–150% space. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 Vividness extension was observed for both pixelation and saturation; in other words, 
subjects selected more resolved (i.e., less pixelated) images in Experiment 5, and more colorful (i.e., 
less desaturated) images in Experiment 6, compared to the true vividness of those scenes viewed 
moments earlier. 
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 For Experiment 5, estimated pixelation was .53, which differed from the true average 
pixelation of .5, t(84)=3.52, SE=0.008, d=0.38, 95% CIbias=0.03[0.015, 0.045], p<.001; Figure 2B. 
 For Experiment 6, estimated saturation was 101.96%, which significantly differed from the 
true average saturation of 100%, t(378)=5.74, SE=0.31%, d=0.29, 95% CIbias=1.96[1.36, 2.56], 
p<.001; Figure 2C. This result goes even further beyond the previous experiments in that scenes 
were essentially recalled as “supersaturated”—not only more saturated than they had actually 
appeared on the display (as in our earlier experiments), but also more saturated than such images 
would natively appear (since the average saturation level estimated by subjects was above 100%). 
This result may thus further suggest that vividness extension is not merely a bias towards “realism”, 
since in this case that might have predicted no effect at all. 
 Finally, since Experiment 6 included values both below and above the “true” saturation 
value, this experiment also allows us to conduct a regression to probe the nature of this tendency. A 
linear regression on the data from Experiment 6 revealed a positive intercept (54.19% saturation, 
SE=0.53, 95% CI=[53.15, 55.23], p<.001) and a slope below 1 (0.48, SE=0.005, 95% CI=[0.47, 
0.49], p<.001, R2=0.32). These results confirm what is also visually apparent from looking at Figure 
2: That there is an overall tendency towards vividness, but that not all values are shifted towards 
vividness; in other words, there is also regression to the mean (in this case, the mean vividness and 
slider values), perhaps reflecting constraints on the response space (for example, at the extremely 
“vivid” ends, there is not much room to move upwards). Still, the positive intercept suggests that 
even the few saturation values that are shifted away from vividness are weaker and less numerous 
than those shifted towards vividness, such that there is still an overall tendency towards vividness 
when considering the entire space of images and responses. 
 These results suggest that the phenomenon of vividness extension is robust and general, and 
that it affects various kinds of image quality—not only blur, but also resolution and saturation. 
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General Discussion 
 
A pervasive and intuitive assumption about memory is that it is merely a faded or degraded 
version of the vivid perceptual experiences it encodes—“by its very nature weaker and fainter than a 
[sensory] impression” (Hume, 1739/1978, p.72–73). By contrast, subjects here misremembered their 
environment as more vivid than it had been in reality. This “vividness extension” effect could not be 
explained by biased responding, went beyond regression to the mean, and generalized across several 
forms of vividness—including blur, saturation, and resolution. 
 
More than a game 
Our results were inspired by the anecdotal surprise that is sometimes observed with respect 
to the vividness of various media; however, these results go beyond their anecdotal inspiration to 
bear on broader questions about the relationship between memory and perception. 
First, these results are perhaps counterintuitive from the perspective that visual short-term 
memories are essentially “reactivations” of sensory states. Since the traces of such sensory states 
decay over time, one might have expected that memories would represent past experiences as more 
faded or grainy (or at least faithfully preserved)—not more vivid (Cooper et al., 2019). Though we do 
not think these results reject or refute sensory recruitment models of working memory (see Xu, 
2017, for a more in-depth discussion), they do suggest that working memory goes beyond simply 
“re-experiencing” images from the past. 
Second, these results may have implications for other debates that rely on (and perhaps 
assume accuracy about) memory for the vividness of our experiences. For example, many currently-
debated issues in perception (and even in the philosophy thereof; Siegel & Byrne, 2017) concern the 
“richness” of perceptual experience—for example, whether dreams or hallucinations are as rich and 
vivid as day-to-day perception (Ichikawa, 2009), and more generally how reliable memory for 
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vividness is (Engelhard et al., 2019). Such arguments, when relying only on introspection, could be 
subject to vividness-extension-like distortions: We might believe our dreams and hallucinations are as 
rich as our waking lives only because we misremember those experiences as more vivid than they 
really were. Participants in such debates, then, could make sure to consider the possibility that their 
memory for vividness is distorted and/or unreliable. 
Finally, these results dovetail nicely with accounts that treat memory not as a reinstantiation 
of perception, but rather as a structured description of what we have seen—one which aims to 
represent the content or reference of an image, rather than storing a faithful copy of the image for 
later revisiting (Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2011; Gallistel & King, 2009; Park et al., 2011). Indeed, 
just as boundary extension adds details outside remembered scenes (Intraub & Richardson, 1989; 
Park et al., 2007; cf. Bainbridge & Baker, 2020), vividness extension suggests that a similar process 
operates even within a scene itself. In other words, our minds store our experiences as though they 
were in “Hi-def”, at every location within the images we see. 
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Open Practices Statement 
 All data and materials supporting these experiments are available at https://osf.io/wjtnx. 
Experiments 3–6 were pre-registered. 
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